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GOVERNANCE BY AGREEMENTS: WHY DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
ENTER INTO MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS? 
 
 
Abstract 
While much can be learned about the roles of interjurisdictional agreements between two 
jurisdictions, little is known about the range and scope of multilateral agreements 
(MLAs) in the provision of collective goods. Based on the theory of institutional 
collective action, this article explores two characteristics of agreements: restrictive and 
adaptive, and seeks to understand why local governments enter into one arrangement and 
not the other. This article argues that the local government decisions to enter into MLAs 
are influenced by the characteristics of goods and services, the nature of 
interjurisdictional relations, the geographic configuration of governments, and the 
number of signatories involved. An analysis of public safety activities in Florida provides 
support for these propositions.  
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GOVERNANCE BY AGREEMENTS: WHY DO LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 
ENTER INTO MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS? 
 
Recently, there has been a tremendous interest in formal agreements in area of emergency 
management (Lynn 2005; Kettl 2007; Nicholson 2007). While formal agreements 
between two jurisdictions are relatively common, agreements with multiple parties are 
much less so.  When they do exist, they tend to establish functionally organized coalitions 
of specialized agencies for finite periods of time---which Friesema (1970) referred to as 
multilateral agreements (MLAs). Are multilateral agreements undersupplied? One reason 
to suspect they are is that, regardless of the collective benefit they provide, MLAs are 
difficult and costly for local actors to create since the transaction costs are generally 
higher than bilateral agreements.  For example, local governments  participating in 
multilateral mutual aid agreements may subject themselves to tort immunity or workers 
compensation issues (Reynolds 2003; Nicholson 2007). Local governments may also find 
themselves  “locked-in” or lose freedom of unilateral action upon entering into an MLA 
(Sonenblum et al 1977; Hirlinger & Morgan 1991).  
MLAs represent special contractual dilemmas. The costs of organizing tasks and 
monitoring the signatories’ behaviors increase with the number of participants. 
Agreements that involve multiple specialized agencies, such as joint planning 
agreements, often involve political bargaining. Indeed, effective preparedness and 
detailed mitigation programs demand the willingness and capacity of multiple agencies to 
plan, regulate, and enforce local land-use and building codes (Waugh 1994). Even though 
agreements among similar agencies may represent homogenous policy goals and 
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preferences, potential conflicts over administrative boundaries and loss of autonomy can 
occur, posing barriers to MLAs.  
The identification of MLAs in previous studies implies they are not ad hoc or 
piecemeal arrangements for regional integration. Rather, MLAs provide an important 
piece in the governance puzzle.  Local governments tend to establish a variety of 
contractual arrangements to accommodate preferences and accomplish specific tasks such 
as interlocal services agreements, mutual aid agreements, joint planning agreements, and 
memoranda of understanding (Atkins 1997; Nunn & Rosentraub 1997; FLCIR 2001).  
However, key questions remain: why do local governments enter into a particular type of 
agreement and not the other; and why do they choose MLAs, even though they could free 
ride on the efforts of others?  
One hypothesis focuses on mechanisms used to control the behavior of 
signatories. Adaptive arrangements, for example, provide broad discretion and flexibility 
for future circumstances; restrictive arrangements, on the other hand, provide procedural 
characteristics, authority, and outcome requirements that are clearly stated in advance to 
ensure that parties fulfill the terms of their contracts. Neither mechanism, however, is free 
from the transaction costs of contracting.  Thus, local governments choose the one with 
the least costs in order to govern their transactions.   
 This study departs from prior work on survey-based perceptions of formal 
agreements by differentiating different types of MLAs (Friesema 1970, 1971; McDavid 
1977; Smith 1979; ACIR 1985; Hirlinger & Morgan 1991; Foster 1998; Thurmaier & 
Wood 2002). The analysis examines the structure and characteristics of all MLAs  
reported by Florida’s major county and municipal governments. Specifically, it analyses 
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the contents of MLAs, which include information on the type of agreements, the 
activities carried out by the government units, the number of signatories, the functional 
unit that provides the services, and the status of the agreements.  
This study focuses on MLAs in Florida in activities of public safety---fire, police, 
and emergency medical services (EMS).  Studying MLAs for specific categories of 
services in a single state has its limitations, but there are also advantages. It allows us to 
control for statutory variation across states and provides an opportunity to study the 
choice of agreements in-depth. Florida is one of the most progressive states in 
encouraging interlocal coordination through formal agreements, and given its 
geographical location, most local governments---acting as first-line responders---allocate 
substantive budgetary amounts for public safety activities in order to respond to major 
disasters (such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and flooding) and routine law enforcement 
activities (such as drug trafficking, traffic patrol, and law enforcement). Although the 
advantages of MLAs can be realized when local governments agree to work together, 
they are often strained by past conflicts and rivalries, making public safety a worthwhile 
activity to study (Ostrom & Whitaker 1973; Ostrom et al 1973; McDavid 1977; Carr & 
LeRoux 2005). 
The following  section lays out the theoretical arguments linking transaction costs 
to local government choices about MLAs. The second section explores explanations for 
local government decisions based on the institutional collective action framework. The 
third section identifies the methods, data on MLAs in Florida, and the characteristics of 
goods and services related to public safety activities. The fourth section reports the 
findings. The conclusion identifies future research needs for MLAs.     
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STRATEGIES AND MECHANISMS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Why do local governments enter into MLAs? The conventional answer is that a 
MLA is a consequence of joint benefits that can be anticipated by negotiating parties. 
Transaction costs theory complicates this answer by asserting  that uncertainties impose 
costs on intergovernmental relations. Absent foresight, local governments cannot agree 
on a substantive response to uncertainty, so in order to minimize costs of planning, 
adapting, and monitoring task completion across jurisdictions, binding contracts are 
crafted as a procedural safeguard to reduce uncertainty (Gillette 2001; Brown & Potoski 
2003; Feiock 2004; 2007). Collective action theory posits that uncertainties impose costs 
on interjurisdictional agreements.  Various arrangements sanctioned by the state provide 
alternative mechanisms for managing uncertainty according to their available capital and 
human resource endowments.  However, these alternative arrangements also impose 
different costs on local governments’ relationships.  Thus, local governments enter into 
an agreement in a bounded rational fashion by selecting an arrangement to achieve task 
completion that simultaneously minimizes the transaction costs of contracting. 
A variant of transaction costs theory argues that decisions to enter into agreements 
depend upon the structural arrangements established by the agreements. For example, 
mutual aid/operational assistance agreements can be used as legal documents to establish 
organization, typically by function, in order to coordinate activities of various local 
entities. Administrative bodies such as bomb squads or regional task forces have strong 
functionally organized bureaucracies to ensure stability and decisiveness (Lynn 2005; 
Kettl 2007).  Public officials seeking stability through organizational structure can opt for 
legally binding agreements to safeguard their property rights such as specialized 
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equipment, protection against tort liability, and reimbursement of actual costs when 
performing mutual assistance. 
The theoretical and empirical basis for the transaction costs argument remains 
underdeveloped. Theoretically, there are variations in the types of agreements available 
to local governments (Miller 1981; ACIR 1985; Atkins 1997; Nunn & Rosentraub 1997; 
FLCIR 2001). An informal agreement leaves local governments less secure in their rights 
to adjudication during a dispute, but such an arrangement is relatively easy to modify 
should unforeseen circumstances arise. Memoranda of understanding and/or memoranda 
of agreement can greatly reduce the transaction costs of writing and implementing an 
agreement compared to interlocal service agreements, but they are nonobligatory, 
reciprocal, and yet easily terminated without significant legal consequences. Mutual aid 
or operational assistance agreements, on the other hand, are only operative “when certain 
conditions come into existence and they remain in operation only so long as these 
conditions are present.” (Bollens & Schmandt 1965: 77) 
The methodologies of empirical studies on MLAs have not advanced much 
beyond the surveys on interjurisdictional agreements conducted in the 1970s. The 
difficulty lies mostly in how to identify the different kind of agreements. Several studies 
count the number of bilateral agreements by service categories (Friesema 1970, 1971; 
Thurmaier & Chen 2005); developing survey instruments to determine the extent of 
utilization of agreements (ACIR 1985; Hirlinger & Morgan 1991; Carr & LeRoux 2005); 
and conducting interviews and surveys to determine the attitudes of local officials toward 
such agreements (Smith 1979; Foster 1998). Consequently, most agreements are 
classified as a single arrangement and thus fail to provide insight on how different types 
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of agreements produce different incentive structures for local governments to form 
alliances (Feiock 2004; 2007). 
 
Adaptive and Restrictive MLAs 
The range of MLAs can be characterized as adaptive or restrictive. An agreement 
is “restrictive” if it can protect local governments’ property rights through a set of clearly 
specified rules. Safeguards depend on the extent to which parties can come to a 
consensus on the effectiveness of an agreement governing their transactions. To be 
effective, the arrangement must be backed by specific state statutes or legally and 
economically defensible local ordinances. The specific services to be rendered and the 
organizational structure established are predictable and can be included in the agreement. 
The legal regime that induces the desired cooperative behavior is the one that enforces 
the promises to the letter. Stability and decisiveness can be promoted because the set of 
working rules that determines specific outcomes produces stability for all parties 
involved in the arrangement. This is particularly important because, unless the agreement 
is very specific, the passage of time and turnover of local decision-makers can erode and 
obscure the original basis of the agreement (FLCIR 2001). Examples of restrictive 
arrangements include legally binding contracts such as interlocal service agreements, 
contracts, or lease agreements. A restrictive arrangement may also include a hybrid 
mutual aid/operational assistance agreement. 
On the other hand, the existence of adaptive arrangements such as mutual aid 
agreements, memos of understanding, letter of agreements, or informal agreements can 
also provide alternative mechanisms to secure coordination. One of the advantages of an 
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adaptive arrangement is that it specifies the activities to be rendered without 
unnecessarily intruding on the authority of other jurisdictions. Sclar (2000), for example, 
considered a flexible contract to be an arrangement established by parties in complex 
settings leaving the details to be filled in later. This arrangement produces a flexible 
organizational structure in order to provide general guidelines for locally-coordinated 
efforts. They are purposely designed to complement pre-existing policies as opposed to a 
nearly crafted joint vision to improve the overall welfare of the participating local 
governments’ constituents. However, the extent to which they have been used to secure 
coordination is still an open question.  
These broad characteristics are consistent with the transaction costs approach in 
the sense that the working rules embedded in a range of interlocal agreements can be 
identified and aggregated, and then compared based upon their characteristics. Depending 
upon the authority granted by state statutes, the restrictive and adaptive arrangements 
would allow us to define the scope, stringency of requirements, and the degree to which 
local governments can enforce their claim if signatories default and therefore, permit us 
to predict how local governments will behave given the uncertainty of their transactions. 
Moreover, we are most interested in determining not only the general pattern in which 
different factors can affect local government’s contractual choice, but also the context in 
which the arrangements are formed.  
 
DETERMINANTS OF MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
 The decision  to enter a restrictive or adaptive agreement presents a challenging 
institutional design problem because local actors must overcome collective action as well 
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as transaction cost problems. The institutional collective action perspective suggests that 
institutional design results from efforts to minimize the costs of developing and 
maintaining contractual arrangements (Scholz & Feiock 2007).  Local officials 
participating in MLAs may be concerned whether assistance can be provided in a timely 
and equitable manner to their constituency if others request similar aid. Crafting a legally 
binding contract is also an option, but it is almost impossible for localities to assign 
monetary values or specify detailed reciprocal emergency aid and assistance before 
disasters occur. Although it is difficult to imagine an instance in which a jurisdiction in 
critical need of assistance would not receive it from neighboring governments, the 
decision not to provide assistance is also a strategic act available to avoid legal liability 
and financial costs. We argue that the transaction costs associated with MLAs are further 
exacerbated by the problems of institutional collective action.  
Institutional collective action problems occur when the transaction costs of 
organizing tasks and monitoring the behaviors of signatories increase with uncertainties. 
The problem gets complicated when an agreement involving multiple agencies requires 
political bargaining and compromises. It is uncertain whether signatories would claim 
fiscal hardship or avoid implementation of an agreed set of plans by deliberately 
underestimating their capacities to meet standards of mitigation, preparedness, response, 
and recovery activities. Consequently, localities with the most resources may have to 
compensate for their shortcomings. If a significant number of signatories adopt this 
pattern of behavior, the rewards produced by MLAs will be suboptimal. Although group 
pressure can minimize the dilemma, the costs of communicating with other parties and 
reaching a joint decision are generally high, especially when the number of signatories 
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increases. Because of these dilemmas, some localities would prefer to have a legally 
binding contract or a restrictive arrangement to minimize the risk of opportunism. 
Building from the ICA framework, the following sections identify four factors that shape 
the transaction costs of contracting: the nature of goods and services, the number of 
signatories involved, interjurisdictional relations, and the geographic configuration of 
governments.   
Characteristics of goods and services: While some activities may require local 
governments to work collaboratively with different specialized agencies to get the job 
done, local officials must customize their arrangements according to the nature of goods 
and services (Ferris & Graddy 1986; Post 2004; Stein 1990; Brown & Potoski 2003). For 
goods and services with high sunk costs and outcomes difficult to specify in advance, the 
transaction costs are especially high, especially if the arrangements are based on 
restrictive arrangements. However, when coupled with uncertainty that future 
circumstances may change, local governments could find themselves trapped by the 
agreed set of rules, leading to a joint-decision trap (Baird 1990; Gillette 1990; Scharpf 
1998). As an alternative, an adaptive arrangement can be crafted in order to avoid future 
disputes. This type of arrangement is preferred because signatories can behave flexibly 
according to changed circumstances. 
In public safety, MLAs have been used by local governments to cope with routine 
and non-routine emergency activities. For example, activities of law enforcement 
agencies are highly diverse ranging from recurring and routine public safety services 
(such as standard police patrol, educational programs, enforcement of sanitation and 
licensing regulations, control of crowds) to civilian defense and disaster duties during 
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episodic events (such as evacuations planning, mutual aid responses, and recovery 
efforts). While some routine activities can be shared or provided by other jurisdictions 
through legal arrangements, episodic activities require the combined efforts of disparate 
agencies across organizational and jurisdictional boundaries.  
Restrictive arrangements are most important for local governments in two types 
of transactions: (1) when local government makes a permanent transfer of total 
responsibility for the provision of a service to another governmental unit such as 
functional consolidation (ACIR 1985; Atkins 1997; FLCIR 2001); and (2) when 
transactions involve some forms of exchange of payments, revenue sharing, or impact 
fees. In addition to issues related to delegation of power and financial transfers, local 
governments may enter into restrictive arrangements in order to protect themselves from 
inherent risks associated with highly asset specific transactions (Brown & Potoski 2003; 
1985). The arrangements for these transactions, as authorized by a state statutory 
framework, are legally binding. 
On the other hand, when services involve knowledge-based specificity, local 
governments would prefer to enter into adaptive arrangements. Examples include 
standardized procedures, planning and mitigation strategies, technical reports etc. 
Specifying the exact processes and outcomes in advance for such services creates 
difficulties in the sense that they are costly to enforce in a legal system and economically 
costly to monitor. In addition, measurement problems hinder monitoring and effective 
enforcement because they require quantitative measures of what counts as an appropriate 
level of activity by a service provider, or the extent to which the services achieve their 
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desired impacts (Brown & Potoski 1985). In this circumstance, a more adaptive 
arrangement will be established to govern their transactions.  
Number of signatories: The number of signatories in an agreement is also salient 
to local institutional design decisions. But, the effects of group size on contractual choice 
are ambiguous (Pisano 1989; Gulati 1995; Gulati & Singh 1998). On one hand, the larger 
the number of signatories, the greater the possibility that labor and specialization will be 
divided, resulting in an increased likelihood that local governments will cooperate and 
benefit from the agreement. On the other hand, the larger the number of potential 
collaborators, the greater the difficulty of communication among the members and the 
less stable the interlocal cooperation. Pisano (1980) observes that the larger the number 
of partners involved in an agreement, it is more likely that an alliance will be based on 
relational contracting. Gulati (1995) and Gulati and Singh (1998) conclude that this 
variable has no statistically significant impact on the choice of governance form. By 
contrast, Oxley (1997) found a larger scope of partners has a significant and positive 
effect on the probability of relational contracting. 
The number of signatories dictates the relative distributional gains and 
organizational costs. For instance, the smaller the group, the easier it is to establish a 
restrictive arrangement because there are fewer problems determining how benefits will 
be distributed. The monitoring costs will also be lower and thus, signatories will be less 
likely to act opportunistically. A large number of signatories will decrease the relative 
benefits to individual participants; it will lead to greater organization costs and thus, there 
is a tendency for signatories to free ride on the efforts of others. The transaction costs are 
higher as the number of signatories increases. For example, a qualitative study conducted 
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in Iowa by Irene Rubin (2004) reports evidence that local governments entering into an 
MLA require a level of ongoing participation to keep the service going and solve 
problems. The need for ongoing participation creates some informal limits to how many 
MLAs can be entered into by localities. So, we would expect a larger number of 
signatories would lead local governments to enter into an adaptive arrangement. 
Intergovernmental relations:  Conventional wisdom suggests that localities are 
highly competitive and face obstacles to divide bargaining surpluses from cooperative 
efforts. Although they share similar concerns, their attempts to improve conditions are 
impeded by strategic acts to capture the greater share of the surplus (who should get the 
credit). Hence, contractual arrangements between municipal governments are likely to be 
based on a clear set of working rules in order to secure a distributive surplus. On the other 
hand, local governments may work collaboratively through adaptive arrangements. 
Although their pre-existing relations may be strained by past conflicts and rivalries, they 
need not enter into a restrictive arrangement. They can take advantage of redundancy in 
local emergency responses, resources and personnel through adaptive arrangements 
covering a large and multi-jurisdictional boundary. The higher the number of 
municipalities located within a county, the more likely an adaptive MLA will be 
employed to avoid future disputes. 
Intergovernmental relations can also be captured by agreements involving 
specialized provision units such as police, EMS, and fire services. For example, an 
agreement that involves two or three specialized agencies is not uncommon in Florida. 
There has been a gradual increase in the trend of local governments merging or 
consolidating their EMS with other functional areas such as fire or police in order to reap 
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the economies of scope and scale. But, under certain conditions, this need not be the case. 
When an agreement affects the administrative boundary of a provisional unit, parties to 
the agreement might incur high transaction costs in negotiating, operating, and enforcing 
their multiple preferences. We expect an MLA with restrictive arrangements will be 
preferred over operating and enforcing the provision of a service in order to avoid future 
disputes. 
On the other hand, an MLA---established by similar functional agencies--- 
represents homogeneity of policy goals and preferences. Having similar concerns and 
policy goals can reduce the transaction costs of negotiating an agreement, and thus should 
motivate specialized agencies to choose an adaptive arrangement as opposed to an 
agreement involving multiple specialized agencies. For example, McDavid’s (1977) 
study of 26 independent police departments in St. Louis County found unwritten mutual 
aid agreements and information agreements have positive impact on police performance 
suggesting smaller jurisdictions have the capacity to develop informal networks of 
intergovernmental relations to facilitate the delivery of services in multiple-jurisdictional 
settings. This conclusion is similar to other empirical studies on police performance 
(Ostrom & Whitaker 1973; Ostrom et al 1973). 
Geographic location and number of jurisdictions: Localities that are prone to 
natural disasters and evacuation concerns are more likely to enter into adaptive 
arrangements rather than restrictive arrangements in order to take advantage of 
redundancy in local emergency response. Geographic location reflects local preferences 
i.e., as expressed through residents particular cultural and social styles of living. For 
example, residents living along the coastlines---defined by their social and economic 
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status---tend to have homogenous preferences and are likely to have higher expectations 
of their local officials on public safety activities. Because demographic homogeneity 
reduces agency costs for officials negotiating interlocal agreements on behalf of citizens, 
we can expect intra-jurisdictional homogeneity will increase the likelihood of MLAs. The 
nature of such arrangement is still an open question, however.    
Feiock (2007) has suggested that fixed geographic border creates 
interdependencies. Governments with common borders are not stuck in a one-shot 
prisoner’s dilemma; the impossibility of exit means defection from cooperation exposes 
the defector to retaliation.  The prospect of future play with the same party constrains 
opportunism such that it is in the interest of each government to cooperate with neighbors 
who cooperate. This suggests the tendency for local governments to enter into a mutual 
aid or memoranda of agreement since it would be sufficient to curb opportunistic 
behaviors through informal sanction. The higher the number of jurisdictions within a 
political boundary, the more likely they would enter into adaptive arrangement if such 
arrangement can provide opportunities for mutual assurances that each government will 
contribute to the provision of the collective good.   
However, the higher the number of municipalities located within a county’s 
political boundary, the more likely their relationships could be strained by rivalries and 
past conflicts and thus, the more likely a restrictive MLA will be employed to avoid 
future disputes. Moreover, if local officials are still concerned whether assistance can be 
provided in a timely and equitable manner, the likelihood of agreements with the state or 
other jurisdictions independently will be very high.    
We also control for vulnerabilities of localities given their proximity to the 
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coastlines. This variable captures local government decisions when there is a need to 
become more resilient to natural disasters i.e., by establishing MLAs (Comfort 2006). 
  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
Identifying Multilateral Agreements 
To gain a better sense of MLAs used by local governments, consider a combined 
mutual aid/operational assistance agreement in the realm of public safety in Florida. The 
agreement is aimed to coordinate multiple-jurisdiction activities in an event requiring an 
emergency response to bomb threats, explosives, hazardous devices, and weapons of 
mass destruction in the Florida Big Bend region. Under the Big Bend Bomb Squad 
agreement authorized by Section 23.12, Fla. Stat., the core group is a frontline taskforce 
consisting of four law enforcement agencies in Leon County1. As the producer of this 
service, the taskforce’s responsibility remains in Leon County at all times and may 
provide first line response to the other 12 counties in the Big Bend region only upon 
request.  
Take another example. A group of seven counties, nine municipal governments, 
and one independent special district in Central Florida recently entered into a “Permitting 
Mutual Aid Agreement” under which the actors agreed to establish administrative and 
standard procedures to be used when responding to non-routine emergency activities. An 
outcome of the agreement takes the form of a non-hierarchical structure. There is no 
central actor to coordinate the activities of members but the agreement carries broad 
associational and practical benefits. For instance, even though the agreement, as 
                                                 
1  The taskforce consists of personnel from the State of Florida Division of Fire Marshals, 
Florida Department of Law Enforcement (Division of Capitol Police), Leon County Sheriff's 
Office, and Tallahassee Police Department. 
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sanctioned by Florida’s Mutual Aid Act, grants the assisting personnel the same powers, 
duties, rights, privileges and immunities they command in their own jurisdiction, the 
assisting party, acting on its sole discretion, can still withdraw assistance at any time. 
 These examples illustrate the different structural outcomes produced by MLAs. 
The arrangements define the scope, stringency of requirements, and the degree to which 
local governments can enforce their claim if signatories default, and thus may be used 
strategically by local government to span administrative and political boundaries. In order 
to differentiate these possibilities, we identify the different types of MLAs in Florida 
utilizing the data from various Interlocal Service Delivery Reports (hereafter the Report). 
The information is compiled by the Florida Department of Community Affairs2. The 
Report contains information on the types of agreements and the activities carried out by 
local governments from 1973 to 2003. The Report also includes the number of signatories 
in an agreement, the functional unit that provides the services, and the status of an 
agreement.  
In order to systematically identify the MLAs from the Report, we tried to ensure 
that the arrangements listed were in accordance with statutory definitions. For example, 
the Interlocal Cooperation Act of 1969 (s. 163.01, Fla. Stat.) provides a broad legal 
framework for local governments to enter into agreements with either the public or 
private sector; the Florida Mutual Aid Act authorizes local and state law enforcement 
agencies to enter into mutual aid or operational assistance agreement; and Florida’s 
Growth Management Act, which has “had a significant impact” on encouraging 
                                                 
2  Under Chapter 2002-296, Law of Florida, added sections 163.3177(6) (h) 6, 7, and 8, Fla. 
Sta., all counties in Florida with greater than 100,000 population and their municipalities and 
special districts were required to prepare and submit the Report to Florida Department of 
Community Affairs. 
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intergovernmental coordination through the use of joint planning agreements (FLCIR 
2001). Although most localities generally made implicit reports on the types of 
agreements governing their transactions, others did not. To overcome this problem, we 
relied on the substantive titles of reported agreements and matched them against the 
statutory framework that authorized their usage to gain insight into the structural 
arrangements established by local governments. 
The Report highlights an array of agreements ranging from interlocal service 
agreements to contract and lease agreements, from mutual aid agreements to memoranda 
of understanding, to joint planning agreement and letters of agreement (Table 1). To 
capture the different arrangements, whether they are authorized by the state statutes or 
not, MLAs are classified into two general forms: restrictive and adaptive. The adaptive 
arrangement includes mutual aid agreements, memoranda of understanding, and letters of 
agreement. The restrictive arrangements include interlocal service agreements, joint 
planning agreements, contracts, lease agreements, or a hybrid arrangement that 
establishes a single or two-tier hierarchical structure such as the Permitting Mutual Aid 
Agreement in Central Florida and the Big Bend Region’s Bomb Squad Mutual 
Aid/Operational Assistance agreement respectively. We identified 390 MLAs in Florida’s 
32 largest counties. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Identifying Characteristics of Goods and Services 
To test the proposition that characteristics of goods and services have an effect on 
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contractual choice, services are classified by their asset specificity and measurement 
difficulty. The approach is an extension of Williamson’s transaction costs theory (1975), 
which defines asset specificity as the extent to which a specialized investment needed for 
the production of one service can also be used for the production of another; service 
measurability refers to the relative difficulty in measuring and monitoring the outcomes 
of the services. However, general service classifications such as that of Brown and 
Potoski (2003) are problematic because, they do not focus on specific functions, account 
for contracting with governments rather than the private vendors, or take into account 
non-routine public safety activities i.e., “Mutual Aid Assistance/Disaster Relief,” 
“Planning/Standard Procedure,” and “Joint Studies/Technical Assistance.”   
Following Brown and Potoski’s procedures, we first identifying the categories of 
goods and services and then conducting a survey of independent experts in emergency 
management and practitioners (n=18). That is, we identified and developed a list of goods 
and services based on previous empirical studies in the realm of public safety and 
matched the list against goods and service involved in our agreements. We then 
characterized each category by a two-by-two transaction costs matrix based on a mean 
rating (i.e., asset specificity mean=3.43; service measurability mean = 2.77). Those 
categories that fall below the mean are characterized as having low asset specificity or 
service measurability; those above the mean are characterized as having high asset 
specificity or service measurability. While high on both asset specificity and service 
measurability problems reflects the importance of a trust-based relationship among 
signatories, low on both characteristics suggests the relative ease by which units of 
governments can enter into binding contracts (Brown & Potoski 2005). Fourteen public 
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safety service categories are identified. Table 2 summarizes their characteristics. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The decision to enter into a restrictive or adaptive MLA is based on the 
comparative advantages of contracting. The proposition is tested using a logistic model, 
where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 for an MLA associated with an adaptive 
arrangement; and 0 otherwise.  Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics. In Table 4 the 
overall model is statistically significant, Chi-square (9) = 114.48, p < .00. The model 
correctly predicts about 77.01 percent of the cases. Diagnostics performed to detect 
multicollinearity above 0.8 suggest no serious problem.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
   
The transaction costs perspective suggest that governments will enter into an 
adaptive arrangement for difficult to measure and highly asset specificity services.    
Local governments would prefer to enter into a restrictive arrangement when a 
transaction involves goods and services that are relatively low on both asset specificity 
and service measurability problems. Table 4 reports that local governments are more 
likely to enter into an adaptive,  rather than restrictive, contracts when goods and services 
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have high rather than low asset specificity and measurability problems, =4.65, p < .00. 
Specifically, on average, an MLA is more likely to be in an adaptive rather than 
restrictive arrangement by a factor of 104 times when the characteristic of goods and 
services has high rather than low asset specificity and service measurability problems, 
holding the other independent variables constant.  
β
Within the context of public safety, when public officials are faced with multiple 
tasks requiring specialized knowledge and their efforts to accomplish those tasks are 
difficult to determine in advance, they tend to opt for an adaptive arrangement. A similar 
conclusion can be reached with goods and services that have low asset specificity but 
high service measurability problems. Here, we can expect an MLA with an adaptive 
rather than a restrictive arrangement to be more likely established by local governments, 
=3.57, p < .00. In an adaptive arrangement, local governments can integrate multiple 
organizational preferences and expertise in the provision of public safety activities such 
as standard procedure and joint technical assistance without having to craft a legally 
binding agreement. 
β
A local government’s decision to enter into an MLA is also influenced by the 
number of potential signatories because size determines the costs of negotiating, 
maintaining, and enforcing an arrangement. As the number of signatories gets larger, the 
greater the organization costs involved, and the easier it is for localities to free ride on the 
efforts of others. Theoretically, individual localities may not contribute fully to the efforts 
of the collective since the proportion of the shared benefits to a single locality decreases 
as the group size gets larger. Moreover, lack of openness makes it difficult to identify 
who should contribute most to solving complex regional problems. Our results show that, 
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as the number of signatory increases, a flexible or adaptive arrangement will be preferred, 
=0.11, p < .00. Local governments can avoid a joint-decision trap in the presence of 
uncertainty when they can craft an MLA with an adaptive arrangement since the 
fulfillment of the arrangement is generally nonobligatory, reciprocal, and yet easily 
terminated without significant legal consequences compared to a restrictive arrangement.  
β
However, the extent to which an adaptive arrangement is feasible depends on the 
pre-existing relationships of signatories. Given the geographical proximity of local 
governments, pre-existing relationships may not be an immediate issue, but local politics 
often complicates future policy preferences and thus may affect the motivation for 
cooperation. We employed two variables as proxies for interjurisdictional relations: the 
number of municipalities located within a county political boundary and the functional 
categories of service providers (i.e., police, fire, EMS, or any combination of providers). 
We assume adaptive MLAs can provide opportunities for mutual assurances if each 
signatory will contribute to the provision of the collective goods. Bearing this in mind, 
we can expect the number of jurisdictions within a political boundary to have a positive 
effect on the type of MLAs. Our results show that, on average, as the number of 
municipalities within a county increases by one unit (ranges from 1 to 38 units), we can 
expect the likelihood of adopting an adaptive rather than a restrictive arrangement to 
increase by a factor of 1.03 times, holding the other variables constant, =0.03, p < .07. β
As for the functional categories of service providers, an agreement in the 
company of similar functional agency, an adaptive arrangement is more likely than 
restrictive arrangement when compared to an agreement involving multiple specialized 
agencies. This is because agencies having similar concerns and policy goals can reduce 
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the transaction costs of negotiating an agreement. The variable is treated as a nominal 
category where the involvement of multiple specialized agencies is regarded as the 
benchmark. The result shows that when compared to an MLA that is made up of several 
specialized agencies, an MLA for police departments is more likely to be based on a 
restrictive rather than an adaptive arrangement, = -1.00, p < .00. The usage of a 
restrictive contract such as an interlocal service agreement, leases, or contracts, reflects 
how the presence of local politics can influence the type of arrangement used to govern a 
contract. On the other hand, when compared to an MLA involving several specialized 
agencies, an MLA entered into by EMS or a fire department tends to be based on flexible 
contracting. The differences are not statistically significant, however.   
β
 
CONCLUSION 
 Why do local governments enter into a particular type of MLA? In addition to 
economic and legal reasons, theoretically, local governments enter into MLAs for 
strategic reasons. Depending on the characteristics of goods and services, the nature of 
interjurisdictional relations, and the number of signatories involved, local governments 
can minimize the transaction costs of contracting based upon the governance structure 
established by the agreements. 
Empirically, our results provide strong statistical evidence that the number of 
signatories influences the decisions of local government i.e., on the type of MLAs. This 
finding is by no means obvious, for the transaction costs literature is divided on what 
types of agreements local governments would enter into given a particular number of 
potential signatories (Pisano 1989; Gulati 1995; Oxley 1997; Gulati & Singh 1998). One 
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explanation emphasizes the tendency to establish restrictive arrangements to control 
opportunistic behavior since a large number of signatories would suggest higher 
monitoring costs; while another explanation calls attention to the importance of 
associational or group norms which could bring about informal sanctions to curb 
opportunistic behavior. 
The nature of goods and services also influences the type of arrangements, and 
these arrangements are not confined to contractual decisions with organizations in the 
private or nonprofit sector (Brown & Potoski 2003). By showing the extent to which 
local governments’ decisions might be influenced by the characteristic of goods and 
services, this article’s results speak to the enduring paradox of local government’s 
participation in MLAs while highlighting the difficulty in maintaining adaptive contracts 
because of intergovernmental relations (Ferris & Graddy 1986; Hirlinger & Morgan 
1991; Stein 1990; Post 2004). This finding is by far the most cited reason why local 
governments might establish agreements with another government rather than 
organizations in the private or nonprofit sector. 
However, there are several limitations in our findings. An underreporting of 
agreements in public safety activities by local governments is highly probable. This is 
largely because most local governments do not keep a central file on all written and 
unwritten agreements. Furthermore, because most MLAs are based on self-reporting 
made by large counties in Florida, information on public safety agreements may reflect 
activities between municipalities and county governments. There is no obvious way 
around these shortcomings since no other systematic gathering of agreement-specific 
information is currently available at the state level. Nevertheless, this study makes several 
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contributions. Unlike prior studies, which largely used cross-sectional survey data and 
case studies to capture local officials’ perceptions of cooperation, our analysis takes on 
the characteristics of the agreements. It provides insights on how different types of 
agreements may produce different incentives structures for local governments to enter 
into MLAs. 
Of course, all things are not equal. Future research should explore the importance 
of the state statutory framework. Local governments’ decisions are often influenced by 
the state statutory framework and local political institutions, which may be specific in 
articulating the administrative procedure for forming agreements (Carr 2004). As 
documented by Atkins (1997): Local government efforts to consolidate ambulance and 
fire services through interlocal service agreements may require public support as well as 
union blessing; municipal governments providing assistance to the County Sheriff’s 
Office through mutual aid agreements depend on the good faith of all parties; and the 
joint efforts of special districts to initiate tax sharing activities may require local 
ordinance and state legislature approval. Although in-house provision and production is 
always an option, state and local institutions may specify the administrative process for 
contracting out certain services and activities to other jurisdictions (Miller 1981).  
Future research should examine the importance of associational benefits 
generated by MLAs. For example, an MLA having adaptive characteristics generally 
would require local governments to develop ongoing relationships with different 
specialized agencies in order to accommodate and coordinate diverse policy preferences 
(Thurmaier & Wood 2004; Lynn 2005). The need for ongoing relationships creates some 
informal limits to how many MLAs can be entered into by localities. The more diverse 
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the policy preferences, the more time and effort would be required to ensure deliberative 
processes are made consensually. Although public safety activities are interrelated and 
pre-existing relationships may not be an immediate issue, local politics often complicate 
future policy preferences and affect the contractual choices made by local governments. 
The problem becomes acute as multiple levels of government are involved. 
Moreover, an MLA often leads various signatories to take on multiple roles. For 
instance, when entering into MLAs, individual localities not only must improve their 
capabilities and strategize responses to local concerns, they must also coordinate 
activities with other localities. Since local governments’ concerns are rarely over a single 
issue, they must allocate internal resources to spread risks, build local capacities, and 
adjust their efforts in other areas. Consequently, activities in one functional area may 
have implications for another area (Scholz & Feiock 2007). In short, MLAs, which 
provide alternative governance structures for local governments to coordinate activities 
across political boundaries, may have implications for other policy areas that not obvious 
to policy makers.  
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Table 1   
Types of Agreement in Provision of Public Safety (Frequencies) 
Type of Agreements Frequency Percentage 
Interlocal Service Agreement 163 41.8  
 
Mutual Aid Agreement*  165 42.3  
 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)/ 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) 
31 7.6  
 
Joint Planning Agreement  17 4.4  
 
Contract/Lease Agreement 7 0.3  
 
Informal/Letter of Agreement** 1 0.3  
 
Others***  
(i.e., Ordinance, Permit) 
6 1.5  
 
Total  390 100  
Notes: * Statewide mutual aid agreements are excluded. Mutual aid agreement includes  
operational assistant agreements 
** Based on self-reporting and likely to be underestimated by local governments.  
*** Some agreements are difficulty to classify given lack of description by reporting 
counties. Data include specific ordinance and permits.  
Source: Author’s data coding. Taken from various interlocal service delivery reports by 32 major 
counties, Florida’s Department of Community Affairs (2003). 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Characterization of Public Safety Service Categories 
 Low Asset Specificity High Asset Specificity 
Low Service  Licensing equipment/ software Police/Fire/EMS communications 
Measurability Billing and financial transfers Educational/Training programs  
 Vehicle fleet maintenance Emergency medical services 
  Prisons/Jails 
 
High Service  Planning/standard procedures Fire protection/prevention 
Measurability Technical studies/assistants Law enforcement/police patrol 
 Operation of building/shelters Mutual assistant/disaster relief  
  Crime prevention /investigation  
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables  
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max
Adaptive Arrangement 0.45 0.49 0 1
Characteristics of Goods and Services:   
     Low Asset Specificity, Low Service Measurability 0.13 0.33 0 1
     High Asset Specificity, Low Service Measurability 0.12 0.32 0 1
     Low Asset Specificity, High Service Measurability 0.17 0.37 0 1
     High Asset Specificity, High Service Measurability 0.59 0.49 0 1
Number of Signatories 6.56 4.37 3 20
Number of Cities in County 12.98 10.41 1 38
Functional Service Areas:   
     Combined Efforts 0.30 0.46 0 1
     Police Services 0.49 0.50 0 1
     Emergency Medical Services 0.03 0.16 0 1
     Fire Services 0.17 0.37 0 1
Coastal Area 0.58 0.49 0 1
   
No. of Observations = 261 
  
 
 
 
Table 4 
Logistic Regression on Adaptive Multilateral Agreements 
 
Dependent Variable: Adaptive Arrangement   
Coefficient 
estimates 
Standard 
error 
Odds  
ratio 
Constant  -4.44*** 1.19 - 
Characteristics of Goods and Services:     
     High Asset Specificity, Low Service Measurability .17 1.53 1.18 
     Low Asset Specificity, High Service Measurability 3.57*** 1.13 35.52 
     High Asset Specificity, High Service Measurability 4.65*** 1.07 104.58 
Number of Signatories .11** 0.04 1.12 
Number of Cities in County .03* 0.01 1.03 
Functional Service Areas:    
     Police Services -1.00*** 0.36 0.37 
     Emergency Medical Services 1.26 1.36 3.52 
     Fire Services 0.39 0.52 1.43 
Coastal Area -0.39 0.34 0.68 
  
No. of Observations                    261  
LR Chi squared                      114.48  
Pseudo R-squared                      0.31   
Log Likelihood                     -122.66  
% Correctly Predicted              77.01    
Note: Level of significance: ***p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.10  
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